Saudi Arabia:
in a restless realm
High tension: Eastern Province protests have been fuelled by events
such as the arrest of Shia cleric Nimr al-Nimr
Regional turmoil and problems at home are plaguing the
world’s biggest oil producer
Saudi
Arabia’s
absolute monarchy watched the demise of its close ally, President Hosni
Mubarak, with alarm. The Al Sauds had sought to avoid this dramatic moment of
change in the Arab world, even pleading with their American friends to save the
Egyptian despot’s regime.
Eighteen months on, however, the conservative rulers
of the world’s largest oil producer and the biggest Arab economy are learning
to adapt. The country last month became the first to host Mohamed Morsi, Mr
Mubarak’s successor, even though he was the candidate of the Muslim
Brotherhood, an Islamist organisation Riyadh
views with great suspicion.
Driven by its customary pragmatism – and the need to
keep Egypt on its side in
the multiple crises facing the region – Saudi Arabia appears to be coming
to terms with the new realities. “Whoever is the Egyptian president, [the
Saudis] know they have to deal with Egypt
and have good relations with Egypt,”
says Jamal Khashoggi, a prominent Saudi commentator. “Saudi Arabia is
totally pragmatic.”
A similar approach characterises its policy towards Syria.
Riyadh fears the civil war could lead to the replacement of President Bashar al-Assad
with an Islamist – yet for almost a year it has been among the most vocal
advocates of the opposition, and one of the few countries believed to be
supplying rebels with money and weapons. It sees the toppling of Mr Assad as a
way of weakening Iran,
an ambitious regional rival with whom Mr Assad is allied.
Meanwhile the most urgent regional crisis – Iran’s pursuit
of a nuclear programme and its perceived desire to dominate the Gulf – has
intensified. The failure of Tehran’s
negotiations with world powers has heightened the prospect of Israeli attacks
that would further unsettle the region.
As a result, Saudi Arabia today faces one of its
most difficult periods since it was founded 80 years ago.
The domestic situation compounds the problems. An ageing
monarchy resistant to political change must focus on appeasing a young
population – increasingly connected to the outside world – concerned about
transparency in government decision-making; the distribution of the country’s
resources, including oil wealth and land; and a dearth of jobs.
Oil prices, currently above $110 a barrel, have
provided Saudi Arabia
with a fiscal cushion. The central bank’s net foreign assets rose to a record
$591bn in June from roughly half that level five years ago. The International
Monetary Fund’s 2012 economic growth forecast is 6 per cent, a contrast with
the outlook for struggling western states. But the country is still heavily
dependent on oil; non-oil exports represented only 12 per cent of the total
last year.
“Saudi
Arabia has faced several challenges throughout its history, but after the Arab
spring these challenges have become greater,” says Hassan al-Mostafa, a Saudi
writer. “This is an extraordinary internal and external situation but they are
trying to control it [by] using the oil bonanza and by ensuring a smooth
transition of power.”
On that score, the royal family has its own troubles.
King Abdullah, 88, remains active and continues to attend meetings – but he has
lost two of his appointed heirs since the onset of the Arab awakening. Their
replacement, 76-year-old defence minister Prince Salman, is likely to pursue a
similar path to King Abdullah, who has sought to improve the efficiency of the
economy but shows little interest in political change, although he has expanded
freedom of speech and given women the right to vote.
The crown prince “understands the crises facing the
state”, says one Saudi reformer. “He listens, he negotiates, and he has taken a
more diplomatic approach with the opposition than some others, but he is hardly
a political reformer.”
Professor Gregory Gause of the University of Vermont
highlights four priorities for Prince Salman. Alongside keeping the political
situation quiet in neighbouring states and checking Iran’s ambitions, these include
“dealing with the aftermath of the Arab spring, which means spending money the
king has already promised” and “continuing to block any kind of political
mobilisation at home”.
Saudi officials assert that the kingdom’s social and
political stability arises from a form of “tribal democracy” seldom appreciated
by the west. The royal family, they argue, is deeply entwined with the public,
unlike the Arab presidents toppled last year. But it also draws upon a
religious establishment with which it is closely allied, a potent security
apparatus, and a tendency to distribute oil wealth in response to crises.
Inspired by the Arab uprisings, reformers including
writers, clerics, human rights activists and professors in February last year
petitioned King Abdullah to establish a constitutional monarchy. The calls were
ignored – but he soon afterwards announced subsidy packages worth $130bn in
salary rises for civil servants, and housing and unemployment benefits. He also
allocated funds to clerics who had declared protests were against Islam, and
outlawed criticism of them.
In addition, an anti-corruption authority was
established to monitor public spending. There is, however, no clear mechanism
for scrutinising the spending of the royal family or the source of its wealth
and extensive land ownership by influential families that stirs anger among a
population struggling with steep property prices.
A crackdown on activists, especially those who called
for a constitutional monarchy, has grown increasingly severe. High-profile
cases include that of Mohamed al-Bajady, sentenced in April to four years in
prison for helping to establish a human rights group.
The most persistent dissent has been in the oil-rich Eastern Province, where the Shia minority has long
complained of discrimination. Protests broke out in February last year as the
families of several prisoners held on terrorism charges since 1996 demanded the
trial or release of their relatives. The government responded with a
combination of heavy security and negotiations between Prince Mohamed bin Fahd
and protesters.
However, demonstrations intensified after troops were
sent to Bahrain last year to prop up a fellow Sunni royal family facing a
popular Shia uprising. The interior ministry in November blamed “foreign
powers”, widely understood to be code for Iran. Although they remain confined
to certain villages in the city of al-Qatif, protests still erupt regularly.
Nimr al-Nimr, a radical Shia cleric and a harsh critic of the government, was
arrested in July after the government accused him of inciting sedition. His
arrest sparked protests in which two men died. So far 11 people have been
killed, including a security officer.
Even as civil rights campaigners press for political
reforms, they acknowledge that the government is not under serious pressure. In
a country lacking political parties, unions and any aspects of civil society
other than charitable organisations run by royals, most of the population’s
primary concerns are economic.
Turki al-Hugail, a Saudi economist, argues education
and employment should take precedence over political participation. “What is
important at this stage is [to] continue to provide for stability and security
at a time when others in the region are diminishing in both aspects,” he says.
“Every young Saudi wants to see first and foremost the country continuing its
prosperity in a predictable domestic environment where we can build a future
like our parents did.”
Most in the upper classes, living in high-walled
mansions and flocking to Europe in summer,
have few complaints. The middle and lower classes, however, often have to fight
for homes, reliable healthcare and – with unemployment officially at about 10
per cent – jobs. The government has tried to enforce “Saudisation” in a private
sector dominated by foreign workers. Under a scheme launched in 2011, many
companies must ensure their workforce comprises 20-30 per cent Saudi nationals.
In practice, with Saudis commanding higher salaries
while many graduates lack the requisite skills, the quota system merely
increases the time businesses spend seeking favours from prominent families in
order to continue employing foreigners. Furthermore, while the rules hamper the
profitability of small and medium-sized businesses, they have less effect on
the largest enterprises, which can find ways around them.
Although dissent levels are not yet sufficient to
alarm the government, technology-savvy young Saudis appear willing to raise
their voices. They note the region’s revolts and elections and – after years of
poor economic decision-making, slow reform and low oil prices in the 1990s –
higher living standards in Gulf states such as
Dubai that lack Saudi Arabia’s natural resources.
In the remote mountain province of Abha,
students protested in March against poor sanitation, demanding the dismissal of
the university head, amid accusations of corruption and nepotism. Students
posted videos of the protests on Twitter and Facebook, gaining support from
others who shared their complaints. Some teachers, medics and airline workers
have organised strikes and protests, seeking better conditions or new jobs.
Increasing numbers of young, educated middle class
Saudis question the effectiveness of ruling a country of almost 27m, only 18m of
whom are nationals, in the traditional tribal way. Despite years of
petitioning, women lack the right to control their employment prospects, and
even their own daily movements.
“The question is not ‘Is the system listening’ but ‘Does it respond to
our needs?’” says Hala al-Dosari, a women’s rights advocate. “Are 9m women
supposed to go and wait by a prince’s door when they can’t get their basic
paperwork done because they need a male relative?’’
As Saudi rulers seek to pick a pragmatic course
through changes transforming the region, the greater question they face is
whether they can adapt to the subtle, but no less significant, evolution of
their own society.
Succession politics
Succession politics in Saudi Arabia is a complex mix of
traditional customs and power play within the sprawling royal family, whose
members number in the thousands.
Power is intended to be transferred by consensus to a
family member who possesses seniority, competence and prestige. Based on
custom, the throne has gone to the sons of the late King Abdelaziz, founder of
modern Saudi Arabia,
who died in 1953. Five of his sons have already ruled as kings; a total of 18
are still alive. Any sons bypassed in the succession have been compensated,
typically with senior posts, other benefits – such as land plots – or jobs for
their sons.
In 1992, the then King Fahd issued the basic laws, a
form of constitution, that stipulated that the throne be reserved for the sons
and grandsons of the founder. The heir apparent is chosen by the king after a
consensus within the ruling family has been reached.
Despite repeated speculation about an imminent
transfer of power to the next generation – the grandsons of the grandsons of
the founder – King Abdullah, the current ruler, has so far stuck with
tradition. Analysts say moving to a new generation would pit too many rival
princes against each other and destabilise the family.
Many in the second generation – Abdelaziz’s grandsons
– however, have already reached an advanced age. For example, Prince Khalid
al-Faisal, son of the late King Faisal and now governor of Mecca, is 72. He is also older than his
uncle, Prince Ahmed, the interior minister, nominally ahead of him in the order
of succession.
“It will take a consensus of all the important figures of the remaining
generation of the sons of King Abdelaziz to set a succession line that achieves
the generational change,” says Gregory Gause, a Saudi expert at Vermont
University. “They might have already formulated a plan, for all we know.”
The formalities for change took a step forward in 2007
when King Abdullah established the Allegiance Council, a body of 35 sons and
grandsons of Abdelaziz who will preside over the succession and the selection
of the next crown prince after the current monarch dies. The council will also
monitor the health of the current king, so that if he becomes incapacitated, a
successor may take over – although such processes are tenuous and remain to be
tested.
King Abdullah has also sought to give greater
responsibility to the second generation. In 2010 he appointed his son, Prince
Mutaib, 59, head of the Saudi Arabian National Guard, an elite unit of tribal
forces charged with protecting the royal family that acts as a counterbalance
to other branches of the military. Another son, Abdelaziz bin Abdullah, is now
deputy foreign minister.
The sons of the most prominent Saudi princes usually
get top jobs. Prince Khaled bin Sultan, son of a late crown prince, is deputy
minister of defence. Prince Mohamed bin Naif, son of late Crown Prince Naif, is
assistant minister of the interior.
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